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NOTES
CUMULATIVE VOTING AND CLASSIFICATION OF DIRECTORS-THE
WOLFSON AND WINOUS CASES
Historical Background
The right to vote is an incident of stock ownership' and there-
fore a valuable property right; 2 it affords the stockholder a means
of protecting his investment.3 At common law each shareholder was
limited to one vote regardless of the size of his holdings. 4 Subse-
quently, statutes were enacted giving stockholders one vote for each
share of stock owned.5 However, directors continued to be elected
under the "straight voting" system which enabled a majority con-
trolling 51% of the votes to elect the entire board of directors. 6 This
system of voting was in keeping with the theory that the majority
had a "right" to control the corporation and direct its affairs.7
A second theory of corporate control, that of minority rights and
minority representation, gained wide acceptance shortly after the Civil
War, largely as a result of public indignation over the then current
business scandals.8 This school of thought asserted that the minority
had a right to representation on the board of directors in order to
provide a check on the majority in control.9 Proponents of this view
were among the members of the Committee on Corporations of the
Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1870. Apparently inspired by a
contemporaneous proposal for cumulative voting for the lower house
I See Matter of North Shore Staten Island Ferry Co., 63 Barb. 556 (N.Y.
Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1872); Matter of Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32,
21 A.2d 697 (Ch. 1941) ; Fein v. Lanston Monotype Mach. Co., 196 Va. 753,
85 S.E.2d 353, 360 (1955).
2 See Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 76 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Pa.
1948); Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443
(1909); Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 263 App. Div. 97,
31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
3 See Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, supra note 2 at 228-29,
87 N.E. at 448-49; Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090
(1906).
4 Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 241 App. Div. 532, 535,
272 N.Y. Supp. 206, 209 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253 (1934)
(dictum); Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 98 Ky. 405, 33 S.W. 188, 190 (1895)
(dictum).
5 Ibid. See, e.g., Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. (3 Boyce) 1,
79 Atl. 790 (1911).
6 See BALLANTINF, CORPORATIONS § 177 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Comment, Cumnula-
tive Voting-Removal, Reductim And Classification Of Corporate Boards,
22 U. CHir. L. REv. 751 (1955).
7 See Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216. Ala. 486, 113 So. 516 (1927); Luthy v.
Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 110 N.E. 373 (1915); Fein v. Lanston Monotype Mach. Co.,
196 Va. 753, 85 S.E.2d 353 (1955).
8 See WILUAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 20-22 (1951).
9 See STLENs, COR'ORATIONS 530 (2d ed. 1949); Comment, supra note 6,
at 752.
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of the state legislature, the Committee recommended a provision for
mandatory cumulative voting in corporate elections. This initial
cumulative voting proposal, which was ultimately accepted and became
part of the Illinois Constitution, reads as follows:
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for direc-
tors or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the
right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned
by him, for as many persons as there are directors or nmanagers to be elected,
or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the num-
ber of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal,
or to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he
shall think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any
other manner.10
Within a decade, mandatory cumulative voting provisions, modeled
after that of Illinois, were incorporated into the constitutions of five
states." The general acceptance of cumulative voting is further evi-
denced by the fact that mandatory cumulative voting provisions are
currently found in the constitutions of thirteen states 12 and in the
statutes of eight others, 13 while permissive cumulative voting is au-
thorized in eighteen states.' 4
Despite the fact that nine states make no provision for cumula-
tive voting,' 5 and the fact that such legislation has recently been de-
feated in two successive sessions of the Wisconsin Legislature,16 there
are several indications that the expansion of cumulative voting is still
under way. In the Banking Act of 1933, for example, Congress pro-
vided that the stockholders of those institutions covered by the act
shall have the right to cumulate their votes.17 More recently, a cumu-
lative voting provision was inserted in the corporation code of the
District of Columbia.' 8 In addition, the SEC, through its decisions,
has fostered cumulative voting in corporations subject to its juris-
10 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (emphasis added). For cumulative voting to
fully effectuate its purpose, all the directors must be voted upon at one time and
not in turn. See Wright v. Central California Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70
(1885).
"l Nebraska (1871) ; West Virginia (1872); Pennsylvania (1873); Missouri
(1875) and California (1879).
12 See WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIREcrORs 7-8 (1951).
13 Id. at 34.
14 Id. at 9 (Texas adopted permissive cumulative voting this year.).
15 Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Vermont and Wisconsin make no provision for cumulative voting.
There was no cumulative voting at common law; the right exists only by virtue
of statute. See Matter of Brophy, 13 N.J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128 (Sup. Ct.
1935). But see Quilliam v. Hebbronville Utilities, Inc., 241 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951).
16 See Young, The Case For Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 49 (The
Wisconsin Senate defeated cumulative voting proposals in 1947 and 1949.).
1748 STAT. 186 (1933), 12 U.S.C. §61 (1952).
18 D.C. CODE tit. 29, § 29-911(d) (Supp. 1955).
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diction.'? Cumulative voting is also provided for in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act which was drawn up by the American Bar
Association,20 and in a similar act proposed by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. 21
Attempts to Limit Cumulative Voting
Majority stockholders, however, have succeeded in curtailing or
eliminating cumulative voting through a number of devices. In states
where the right to vote cumulatively is permissive rather than manda-
tory, the charters of certain corporations have been amended to re-
place cumulative voting with straight voting.2 2 The courts have
usually upheld such amendments where the proper amending pro-
cedure has been followed. Although the minority stockholders may
have the right of appraisal in this situation,23 many text writers have
criticized this power of the majority to abolish the cumulative voting
right.24  Cumulative voting may also be circumvented by removing
minority-elected directors without cause.2 5  This problem has been
met in some jurisdictions by the enactment of statutes which prohibit
the removal of a director without cause, if the removal is opposed by
a number of votes sufficient to elect a director.26 A third method em-
ployed to prevent effective use of cumulative voting is that of reducing
the number of directors 2 7  A reduction makes it more difficult, if not
impossible, for a minority to gain representation, since a smaller board
will necessitate a larger minority vote in order to elect a single
director.28 California has reached a partial solution to this problem
by requiring that a reduction of the number of directors below five
must be approved by more than an 80% vote. 2 9 Under this provision,
a minority holding 20% of the voting power could prevent a reduction
19 See WILLIAMS, CUMULATVrE VOTING FOR DIREcTRs 14-15 (1951).20 ALI MODEL BusiNESS CORPORATION AcT § 31 (rev. ed. 1953).21 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr § 28(111), in 9 U.L.A.
22 See, e.g., Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 At. 255 (Ch.
1929).
23 See, e.g., Matter of New York Hanseatic Corp., 200 Misc. 530, 103
N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
24 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 406 (rev. ed. 1946); PRASHKER, CORPO-
RATIONS 488 (2d ed. 1949).
25 See Bowes and De Bow, Cumulative Voting At Elections Of Directors
Of Corporations, 21 MINN. L. REv. 351, 366-67 (1937). However, this power
has not been frequently used. See WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR
DIRECTORS 57 (1951).26 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 810 (Deering, 1953) ; MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 450.13(3) (1948); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-405 (Purdon, 1938).
27 See, e.g., Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y.
Supp. 425 (1st Dep't 1910). See Curran, Minority Stockholders And The
Amendment Of Corporate Charters, 32 MICH. L. REV. 743, 764-65 (1934).
28 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 404 (rev. ed. 1946); Curran, supra note
27, at 764-65.
29 AL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 501 (Deering, 1953).
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of the board of directors below five, and, by voting cumulatively, elect
at least one director. Michigan has also placed restrictions on the
majority's power to reduce the number of directors.30 However, in
most states there are no conditions imposed on such reductions. Con-
sequently, they have been upheld despite their harmful effect upon
cumulative voting.3 ' Another device employed to dilute the stock-
holder's cumulative voting right is the "staggered directorate" or
classification of directors. Under the classification system only a por-
tion of the board, usually three directors, is elected at each election.
The effect of such a plan is to reduce the number of directors to be
elected at any given time, thereby making it more difficult for the
minority to elect a director.32 Thus, for example, where there is a
nine man board elected annually, a minority with 25% of the voting
power could elect two directors each year. However, if that board is
classified, so that only three directors are to be elected each year, the
minority holding 25% of the voting power would be unable to elect a
single director.33  Despite this seemingly obvious conflict between
classification of directors and cumulative voting, provision for stag-
gered elections is made in approximately thirty-three states.3 4 In a
few jurisdictions the problem will never arise since annual election of
all directors is required by statute.35
The Wolfson and Winous Cases
During the eighty-five years that have passed since cumulative
voting was first proposed, the classification-cumulative voting conflict
appears to have been considered in only two decisions. In one case
three judges were of the opinion that classification of directors was
of doubtful validity, while the court in the other case denied an injunc-
tion against a staggered election. 6 This was the state of the law
when the case of Wolfson v. Avery 3 7 was presented to the Supreme
Court of Illinois. The plaintiff, a minority owner of common stock
of Montgomery Ward & Company, had protested to the defendants
that the by-law which authorized the election of only one-third of the
company's nine directors each year was unlawful. Subsequently the
30 MicH. Comp. LAWS § 450.13(3) (1948).
3' See Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Corp., supra note 27.
32 See BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNS 417 (1946) ; Comment, Cumulative Voting
-Removal, Reduction And Classification. Of Corporate Boards, 22 U. CHI. L.
Rlv. 751, 754 (1955).
33 Cf. Note, The Wolfson Case: Cumulative Voting and Staggered Elections,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. 112, 120 (1955).
34 WLLIAMS, CumuIA=vW VOrING FOR DIRr oRS 49 (1951); see text at
note 44, infra.3 5 ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 23 (Supp. 1953) ; CAi Coai. CODE ANN. §§ 805, 2201
(Deering, 1953); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 44-109 (Supp. 1955).
'6 See note 33 supra, at 114 n.7.
37 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
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plaintiff filed a complaint against the company and its directors, seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that Section 35 of the Illinois Business
Corporation Act, which authorized classification of directors, and the
company's by-law enacted pursuant thereto, were unconstitutional and
void. The entire litigation turned upon the interpretation to be given
the cumulative voting provision of the Illinois Constitution. The de-
fendants contended that the purpose of cumulative voting is to give
the minority an opportunity to obtain some representation, while the
plaintiff asserted that the right was meant to give the minority repre-
sentation proportionate to its holdings. The defendants claimed that
the words of the constitution, guaranteeing stockholders the right to
vote cumulatively "for as many persons as there are directors or man-
agers to be elected," 38 indicate that it was contemplated that less than
all directors might be elected at each election. Moreover, it was con-
tended that the words "to be elected" would be rendered meaningless
if the court interpreted the constitution as rquiring the selection of an
entire board at each election. The plaintiff, on the other hand,
asserted that the words "to be elected" did not relate to the number
of directors up for election, but merely indicated that the framers were
aware of the fact that the number of directors on a board may vary,
and consequently no specific number was mentioned. Lastly, the de-
fendants pointed out that the fact that classification increases the num-
ber of votes necessary to elect a director is no real objection to classifi-
cation, since the same effect could legally be produced by reducing the
number of directors to three.
The court, however, affirmed the determination of the lower court
which had granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, holding the statute and by-law providing for classification of di-
rectors to be repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of cumulative
voting. The court adopted the view that the framers of the Illinois
Constitution intended cumulative voting to give the minority an op-
portunity for proportional, and not merely some, representation. It
stated that:
It is true, as defendants urge, that the constitutional provision does not
insure a voting strength which is precisely proportionate to stock ownership,
and that the actual operation of the provision in a particular situation will
depend upon three variable factors: the total number of shares, the number
held by the stockholder, and the number of directors. But these variable fac-
tors are inherent in the language of the constitution. Their presence does not,
we think, authorize us to sanction the introduction of another variable which
is not inherent,--classification of directors by terms.3 9
As we have indicated, the general purpose of the provision, as disclosed
in the debates of the constitutional convention and in contemporaneous com-
38 ILL. CONsT. art. XI, § 3 (emphasis added).
39 Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 37, 126 N.E.2d at 707.
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ments and explanations in the press, was to afford a minority protection in
proportion to its voting strength. In the light of such purpose and the evil
sought to be remedied, the section cannot be construed to authorize a method
of selecting directors which results in impairing the value of the right.
4 °
The court resolved the difficulty caused by the vagueness of the phrase
"to be elected" 41 by construing it to mean the whole number of di-
rectors. In reaching the conclusion that the words "to be elected" did
not authorize the election of less than the entire board, the court noted
that the identical wording is found in the Illinois constitutional pro-
vision for political cumulative voting, wherein the number of repre-
sentatives is permanently set at three. 42  Accordingly, it was reasoned
that the words "to be elected" were not intended to give the right to
vary the number to be elected at each election, but rather were to be
read in conjunction with the remainder of the provision and to apply
to the entire number of directors.
Justice Hershey, in his dissenting opinion, vigorously advanced
the defendants' position and asserted that "the effect of the decision
is to judicially amend the Illinois constitution." 43 He stressed the
fact that thirteen delegates to the Illinois Constitutional Convention
were among the members of the legislature that enacted the classifica-
tion statute. In addition he placed much emphasis on the general ac-
ceptance of the principle of classification, stating that:
The results of a survey made of 51 jurisdictions (the 48 states plus Hawaii,
District of Columbia and the Federal government) disclose the following:
36 permit or require classification of directors, and 4 more probably permit
such classification and election for staggered terms. 23 jurisdictions have
mandatory cumulative voting for directors either by statute or by constitutional
provision, and 20 more have permissive cumulative voting if the articles of in-
corporation so provide. And 13 States have both mandatory cumulative voting
and permissive classification of directors. While this does not, of itself, sup-
port the constitutionality of this statute, it does show that classification and
election for staggered terms is widely prevalent, and the Illinois statute is
similar to that in force in the majority of jurisdictions.44
While the Wolfson case was in progress in Illinois, a similar,
though not identical case reached the Ohio Court of Appeals. In
Hum phrys v. Winous Co.,45 minority stockholders owning more than
" Id. at 710.
41 See Ballantine, A Critical Survey Of The Illinois Business Corporation
Act, 1 U. CHi. L. Rav. 357 (1934). In this article Professor Ballantine dis-
cussed the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933. In commenting on the
cumulative voting section, he indicated that the words "to be elected" tended
to confuse and placed them in parentheses, adding a question mark. Id. at 385.
42 ILL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 7, 8.
43 Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701, 712 (1955) (dissenting
opinion).
44 Id. at 716.
45 57 Ohio Op. 44, 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ct. of App. 1955).
[ VOL. 30
40% of the company's stock brought an action to determine their
rights in relation to a proposed amendment of the by-laws. The
amendment sought to classify the company's three-man board of di-
rectors, thereby completely nullifying cumulative voting which is man-
datory in Ohio.46 The significant portion of the court's opinion is
as follows:
The right of a shareholder in an Ohio corporation to cumulate his vote has
been provided by statute in this state for more than fifty years. The legislature
in adopting the revision of the statute dealing with corporate organization in
1927, showed dearly that it intended to strengthen the cumulative voting pro-
vision by adding to existing law the provision that a corporation cannot restrict
cumulative voting by its articles or code of regulations. And when in the same
act the legislature, for the first time provides that there may be classification
of directors when provided for by its code of regulations, it could not have
been intended that the exercise of such right could be so used as to nullify the
right of cumulative voting. When the minimum number of three directors is
provided for, and their terms of office are for three years, one to be elected
each year, the right to cumulative voting is, in such case, completely nullified.
Such a "Code of Regulation" provision under the agreed facts in this case, is
in direct conflict with Section 1701.58 and is therefore, as to The Winous
Company as organized under its present code of regulations, invalid. 47
In concluding, the court held that the provision for classification of
directors was general in nature and restricted in application by the
more specific provision which prohibited any modification of the
cumulative voting right.
Aftermath of the Wolfson and Winous Cases
Although there had been few cases on this problem prior to the
instant decisions, it is probable that the question will be litigated in
other jurisdictions in the near future. Accordingly, it may be worth-
while to compare the approaches taken in the Wolfson and Winous
cases in order to ascertain the considerations which will be deter-
minative of future litigation.
In the Wolfson case the court was faced with a constitutional-
mandatory cumulative voting provision which had strong support in
public policy. Precedents for the strict enforcement of the cumula-
tive voting right were found in the cases in which the courts invali-
dated a statute permitting directors to fill vacancies in the board,48
and refused to construe another to mean that a corporation could issue
non-voting stock.49 Although respect must be given to the state con-
stitution, the court appears to have given little weight to classification
46 OHIo REv. CODE AiN. tit. 17, § 1701.55 (Baldwin, Supp. 1955).
4 7 Humphrys v. Winous Co., supra note 45, 125 N.E.2d at 210.
48 People ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930).
49 People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 I1. 300, 134 N.E. 707(1922).
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of directors and the possible benefits of such a system. The fact that
classification was well established in Illinois at the time of the adop-
tion of the constitution, and the fact that thirteen delegates to the con-
stitutional convention were among the members of the legislature
which passed the classification legislation, indicate that the two pro-
visions may not have been considered incompatible. Ironically enough,
the court in the Wolfson case relied largely upon legislative history to
show that the two could not exist side by side. The decision in the
Winous case reflects a more lenient attitude toward classification of
directors. There, the cumulative voting provision was only statutory,
but mandatory nevertheless. In addition the statute provided that
such right should not be restricted or qualified by any provision in
the articles of incorporation or by-laws. Under these circumstances
the court could have invalidated all classification. However, it chose
a middle of the road course and made an effort to reconcile the two
provisions. In invalidating the classification by-law, the court was
careful to point out that the decision in the instant case was based on
the fact that classification would completely nullify the right to vote
cumulatively. The obvious inference to be drawn was that absent
such complete nullification classification would be permitted.
Both decisions are noteworthy for several reasons. The Wolfson
case was decided by the highest court of Illinois, the state in which
cumulative voting originated. Moreover, in reaching its conclusion,
the court made two important determinations, i.e., that the cumulative
voting right was designed to give minorities proportional representa-
tion and that the statutory language "to be elected" did not authorize
classification. Since a great many cumulative voting enactments are
modeled after that of Illinois, the statutory construction and the find-
ing as to legislative intent in the Wolfson case will be important fac-
tors in future cases arising in other jurisdictions.5 ° In states where
cumulative voting is constitutionally guaranteed, or has a strong foun-
dation in public policy, the case may even be given controlling effect.
The Winous case, on the other hand, will be a valuable precedent
in jurisdictions having permissive cumulative voting and in states
where cumulative voting is mandatory but not based on strong public
policy. In the latter two situations, the outcome would probably turn
upon the relative strength of the public policy behind each of the re-
spective provisions. Broadly speaking, policy considerations favoring
the retention of the right to classify would include the benefits derived
from classification as well as the difficulties involved in uprooting it.
Arguments have been advanced to support classification on the
grounds that it provides the corporation with experienced personnel
and continuity in management. 51 Moreover, many statutes prescribe
5o Cf. Legislation, Constitutionality Of Non-Voting Stock, 39 W. VA. L.Q.
345, 347 (1933).
51 See Matter of Baldwinsville Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 268 App. Div. 414,
51 N.Y.S.2d 816 (4th Dep't 1944). "Although it is true that the provision as
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nandatory classification of directors 52 for certain types of corpora-
tions, apparently for the purpose of obtaining these advantages. As
was previously mentioned, classification antedates cumulative voting
and is authorized in thirty-three jurisdictions. The unforeseeable con-
sequences of abolishing such a well established practice may militate
against such a step. The position of those who favor classification has
also been enhanced by several recent proposals and enactments. In
1954, Congress inserted a permissive cumulative voting provision in
the corporation code of the District of Columbia.53  It also enacted a
section authorizing classification of directors. 54 The Model Business
Corporation Act drawn up by the American Bar Association provides
for both mandatory cumulative voting and classification of directors.
In addition, the 1955 revisions of this act include an alternate cumu-
lative voting section which provides for permissive cumulative voting
if the "statutory policy" does not favor mandatory cumulative voting.55
Both the 1955 permissive cumulative voting revision and the Model
Act's classification provision were recently adopted by Texas. Ac-
cordingly, cumulative voting is now authorized in Texas, unless the
charter expressly prohibits it; and classification is permitted where the
board of directors consists of nine or more members.56 Another re-
cent enactment on the subject is the Ohio classification provision which
became effective October 11, 1955.5T This new section specifies that
to the terms of office of the directors and their classification is phrased in
rather cloudy language, the purpose is evident. Patently it is the intention that,
as nearly as possible, the terms of office of the directors shall be so staggered
that never more than one third will expire in any one year. This will insure
to the association presence on the Board always of at least two thirds who
are experienced in its business. Such a provision is not an unusual one.
(2 Thompson on Corporations [2d ed.], § 1080, p. 16; Banking Law, § 376,
subd. 1, par. [b].)." Id. at 419, 51 N.Y.S2d at 821.5 2 E.g., 38 STAT. 255 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 308 (1952) (mandatory staggered
directorate for Directors of Federal Reserve Banks); 50 STAT. 710 (1937),
12 U.S.C. § 712 (1952) (mandatory classification in National Farm and Loan
Associations); see Matter of Baldwinsville Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., supra
note 51.53 D.C. CODE tit. 29, § 29-911(d) (Supp. 1955).5 4 1d. §29-916(b).
55ALI MODEL BusiNEss CoR'RArON Acr §§31, 35 (rev. ed. 1953);
Alternate Section 31 in REvIsioNs AND OPIONAL SE rIONS APPROVED By THE
Couirz ON CoPaxORATE LAWS OF THE AM RICAN BAR Assoc. (1955).
56Texas Business Corporation Act, arts. 2.29(D), 2.33(A), Laws of Tex.
1955, ch. 64.
57 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1701.57(B) (Baldwin, Supp. 1955). "The
articles or regulations may provide for the classification of directors into either
two or three classes consisting of not less than three directors each, and that
the terms of office of the several classes need not be uniform, except that no
term shall exceed the maximum period [3 years] specified in division (A) of
this section." Ibid. The Final Report Of The Corporation Law Committee
of the Ohio Bar Association, which accompanies the section, states that the new
statute requires a minimum of three directors in each class, in order to meet
"... the objection that has been raised to the effect that under the present
[former] section the majority shareholders may fix the number of directors at
1955 ] NO TES
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the charter or by-laws may provide for classification of directors into
two or three classes, containing not less than three directors each. It
is interesting to note that the Ohio mandatory cumulative voting pro-
vision remains in effect and that the new classification statute appar-
ently codifies the law as laid down in the Winous case. Taken as a
whole, these recent developments appear to indicate that cumulative
voting and classification provisions can be reconciled and may exist
side by side in a corporation's charter or by-laws.
Cumulative Voting and Classification in New York
In New York, provision was first made for cumulative voting
and classification of directors in the Laws of 1892.58 Section 49 of
the New York Stock Corporation Law, the present cumulative vot-
ing statute, is permissive and grants the right only where the charter
of the corporation makes provision for it.59 Nevertheless, it has been
held that where the stockholders agree to amend the charter to pro-
vide for cumulative voting and the officers of the corporation fail to
effectuate the amendment, the courts will enforce the stockholders
agreement if no rights of third parties or public policy is violated. 60
The New York statute which would correspond to a classification
statute is Section 55 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. It
provides, in part, that at least one-fourth of the directors shall be
elected each year. There is some doubt as to whether this provision
may be properly termed a classification statute. In Wyatt v. Arm-
strong,61 the court was of the opinion that Section 55 was intended
to confer the benefits of classification. However, in Matter of Emfpire
three, each director to be in a separate class, with the result that at each annual
meeting only one director is elected, and he would in all cases be elected by the
majority. If at least three directors are elected at an annual meeting, the per-
centage of outstanding shares required to elect one director is only 25% plus
an additional vote." Comment on Section 1701.57. The new classification pro-
vision is somewhat similar to one of the model codes which provides that the
directors may be divided into two or three classes when the board of directors
is composed of nine or more directors. See ALl MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
Acr §35 (rev. ed. 1953).
58 Laws of N.Y. 1892, c. 687, § 20, c. 688, § 20.
59 "The certificate of incorporation of any stock corporation or other cer-
tificate filed pursuant to law may provide that at all elections of directors of
such corporation each stockholder shall be entitled to as many votes as shall
equal the number of votes which (except for such provisions as to cumulative
voting) he would be entitled to cast for the election of directors with respect
to his shares of stock multiplied by the number of directors to be elected, and
that he may cast all of such votes for a single director or may distribute them
among the number to be voted for, or any two or more of them, as he may
see fit. . . ." N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 49.
60 Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253
(1934); see Thistlethwaite v. Thistlethwaite, 200 Misc. 64, 101 N.Y.S.2d 679
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
61 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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Title & Guarantee Co.,62 decided two years later, it was stated that
this section was not meant to be a classification statute but was in-
tended to prevent directors from holding office for long periods of
time without being subject to another election. There appear to be
only two other cases in New York which shed any light on the
strength of the public policy underlying the cumulative voting and
classification provisions. In Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat
Corp.,63 the New York Court of Appeals stated that "[w] e find in
these sections of the statute [which authorize cumulative voting] a
legislative declaration that provision for cumulative voting is not
against public policy ... ." 64 Almost twenty years later Matter of
Rogers Imports Inc.65 was decided. There it was held that the sub-
sequent adoption of cumulative voting impliedly repealed a by-law
which provided that directors could be removed without cause. From
an examination of these cases it appears that New York's policy on
cumulative voting was neutral at the time of the American Fibre Chair
Seat Corp. case, and that a more favorable view existed at the time of
the Rogers case. Dearth of authority prevents the making of a more
definitive statement as to the present status of the law in New York.
Conclusion
There is much to be said for both cumulative voting and the class-
ification of directors. Each provision gives to the corporation or
stockholder distinct benefits that might not otherwise accrue. In rec-
ognition of this fact, the courts should adopt the approach taken in
the Winous case wherever possible. Thus where the two provisions
could be reconciled, both should be permitted to stand; where classifi-
cation of directors would render the minority's cumulative voting
right illusory, the right to classify should be denied or restricted. If
the problem does arise in New York, it will be largely a question of
possible conflict within the corporation's charter; neither a manda-
tory cumulative voting statute nor the state constitution would be
directly involved. Such a case, it is submitted, would be more akin
to the facts presented in the Winous decision than to those before the
court in the Wolfson case. In view of this fact, and in light of the un-
settled state of New York's public policy on the matter, it is hoped
that the reasoning of the Winous case would be followed.
6273 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1947). "Since this section [Section 55] does
not prohibit the election of more than one-fourth, or indeed of an entire new
board each year, it was not intended to stagger the election of directors, but
to prevent the directors from holding office for more than four years without
obtaining the stockholders' renewed approval." Id. at 86.63Supra note 60.
64 Supra note 60 at 420, 193 N.E. at 255.
65202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952), 27 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
357 (1953).
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